Xi Jinping’s rise to power and subsequent consolidation of authority have profoundly reshaped the internal architecture of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By abolishing term limits, sidelining political rivals, and eliminating succession norms, Xi has transformed China’s governance from a relatively institutionalized authoritarian model to a personalist regime centered on himself. While this move may have granted him near-absolute control in the short term, it has also introduced a dangerous fragility into the system. In doing so, Xi has not strengthened the regime — he has made it more brittle and ultimately more prone to collapse.
The Dismantling of Succession Norms: A Dangerous Gamble
Following the death of Mao Zedong and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping and his successors instituted a series of unwritten rules designed to stabilize the CCP’s leadership. These included mandatory retirements, term limits, and collective leadership structures, all intended to prevent the reemergence of autocratic, one-man rule. These reforms created a degree of predictability and internal legitimacy that helped the Party survive and adapt in a rapidly changing world.
Xi Jinping, however, upended this delicate balance. In 2018, the National People’s Congress removed the two-term limit on the presidency, effectively allowing Xi to rule indefinitely. Meanwhile, he purged or sidelined potential successors and rivals — such as Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai — leaving the Party without a clear plan for future leadership transitions.
This lack of succession planning is not just a procedural issue; it creates a strategic vulnerability. History has repeatedly shown that regimes without a clear and accepted mechanism for leadership change are far more likely to experience power struggles, coups, or collapses when the aging leader eventually leaves the scene — whether by death, incapacitation, or political crisis.
Elite Pressure and Factional Instability
In authoritarian systems, elites tolerate centralized control as long as there is a pathway for advancement, material rewards, or influence. By removing those pathways and centralizing decision-making around himself, Xi has created a bottleneck in the political hierarchy. For the politically ambitious within the CCP, there is now no clear way forward.
This builds latent pressure. Some may choose to withdraw, resulting in a stagnating bureaucracy. Others may grow resentful or conspiratorial, especially if they perceive the leader’s grip as faltering. Xi’s extensive anticorruption campaign, while superficially aimed at rooting out malfeasance, has also served as a powerful tool for purging rivals and disciplining the Party elite. The result is a chilling effect on internal debate, a loss of internal checks, and a growing sense of alienation among talented party members.
History offers many examples of how elite defection is a key ingredient in the collapse of authoritarian regimes — from the fall of the Soviet Union to the implosion of Qing Dynasty rule in the early 20th century. Xi’s system, by concentrating power and eliminating elite channels of dissent or promotion, may be planting similar seeds of instability.
A Return to the Emperor Model
Xi’s rule marks a return to a familiar — and dangerous — pattern in Chinese political history: the strongman emperor model. Like imperial rulers of old, Xi stands at the top of a vast bureaucracy held together more by loyalty than by law or institution. This model can appear remarkably stable — but only so long as the central figure remains vigorous, feared, and effective.
Personalist regimes like this are notoriously prone to sudden breakdowns. Without a robust feedback loop — such as free media, independent courts, or democratic elections — poor decisions are unlikely to be corrected internally. Dissent is suppressed, not addressed. Problems are hidden rather than solved. Over time, policy errors, corruption, and incompetence accumulate unchecked.
When such regimes eventually encounter crises — whether economic downturns, military setbacks, or popular unrest — they are often unable to respond effectively, having hollowed out the institutions that might otherwise have managed the problem.
Erosion of the CCP’s Claim to Legitimacy
The CCP has long justified its monopoly on power by claiming to be the vanguard of the people — a meritocratic organization serving national development. In recent decades, this claim shifted toward performance legitimacy, based on delivering economic growth and national pride.
However, Xi’s turn toward personalist rule undermines both narratives. A system that once offered rising stars within the Party a sense of purpose now looks more like a court around a monarch. The Party no longer represents the people — it represents the emperor. In a society where prosperity, education, and global exposure are rising, this shift is not just anachronistic — it is corrosive.
Should the Chinese economy falter, or nationalism fail to mobilize in the face of domestic grievances, the CCP may find itself devoid of ideological legitimacy, resting solely on repression and propaganda.
The Authoritarian Paradox: Resilient Until It’s Not
To be clear, Xi has not guaranteed the fall of the CCP. Authoritarian regimes, especially those with sophisticated surveillance and propaganda systems like China’s, can endure for decades. But what Xi has done is make the system far more fragile — more dependent on a single man, less able to course-correct, and increasingly alienated from both elite and popular sources of legitimacy.
Like many personalist regimes throughout history, the Chinese state under Xi may appear unshakable — until a sudden crack exposes the hollowness within. The risk is not that the regime collapses tomorrow, but that it becomes unable to adapt when crisis inevitably arrives. In that sense, Xi has traded long-term stability for short-term dominance, a choice that may ultimately doom the very regime he seeks to preserve.
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