Emmanuel Macron entered French politics like a lightning bolt. A former investment banker and Economy Minister, he defied political gravity by creating a new party from scratch, defeating both of France's traditional major parties, and winning the presidency in 2017 on a centrist, reformist, and pro-European platform. He offered an appealing vision: to transcend the outdated left-right divide, modernize France, and restore its global and European leadership.
Macron's victory was seen as a repudiation of extremist populism and a triumph of reason, reform, and optimism. But what began as a revolution of the center soon encountered stiff resistance. Despite some notable policy successes, Macron's first term was marred by waves of protest, social unrest, and declining public trust. His second term has been defined by mounting polarization, a resurgent far right, and a fracturing political base. The core issue? Execution.
This essay explores the key executional mistakes Macron made after his bold entrance, and what he could have done differently to turn his political promise into enduring reform and trust.
I. Technocratic Overreach and Top-Down Reform
Macron’s governing style emphasized speed, expertise, and centralized decision-making. From liberalizing labor laws to slashing the wealth tax, his reforms were implemented rapidly, often by executive order, and with minimal input from labor unions or civil society.
The Mistake: Macron mistook legitimacy from electoral victory for a mandate to bypass deliberation. His technocratic style alienated much of the working and middle class, who felt reforms were being "done to them" rather than with them.
What He Could Have Done: Macron could have built participatory mechanisms into his reforms—consultative bodies, regional dialogues, or citizen assemblies to co-design aspects of change. While slower, such inclusivity could have yielded broader buy-in and diffused the perception of elitism.
II. Reform Timing and Sequencing Missteps
Early in his presidency, Macron prioritized pro-market reforms that were seen as benefiting the wealthy. The symbolic elimination of the ISF (wealth tax on high net-worth individuals) and simultaneous tightening of benefits or protections for workers set the tone.
The Mistake: Macron front-loaded politically toxic reforms, undermining the social trust he needed to make deeper changes.
What He Could Have Done: He should have started with widely supported reforms—education modernization, digital government transformation, or regional infrastructure investments. This could have built credibility and goodwill before taking on painful structural overhauls like pension reform.
III. Weak Grassroots Political Infrastructure
La République En Marche! was built quickly to serve an electoral moment. Many of its candidates were political newcomers with shallow community ties.
The Mistake: Macron failed to institutionalize his movement. Once in power, he did not develop strong party structures, local chapters, or lasting community engagement arms.
What He Could Have Done: Macron could have used his presidency to train a new generation of civic leaders, foster local chapters of En Marche!, and build deeper relationships with municipal and regional officials. This would have turned his movement into a sustainable political force rather than a personal brand.
IV. Mismanaging the Yellow Vest Crisis
The Gilets Jaunes protests exploded in late 2018, triggered by a proposed fuel tax. But they quickly evolved into a broader revolt against economic insecurity, social exclusion, and the arrogance of elites.
The Mistake: Macron responded too slowly and too academically. His "Grand Débat" listening tour, though novel, came after months of unrest and failed to produce visible outcomes.
What He Could Have Done: A faster, more emotionally intelligent response—including freezing the tax, acknowledging the symbolic insult to struggling workers, and offering direct relief or participatory reform mechanisms—could have diffused tensions early.
V. Overreliance on Europeanism as a National Vision
Macron positioned himself as the EU's foremost champion, pushing for European strategic autonomy, defense integration, and economic coordination.
The Mistake: Many French citizens—particularly in rural or economically fragile areas—saw the EU as a distant bureaucracy. Macron’s Europhilia was often perceived as privileging Brussels over the French people.
What He Could Have Done: He could have grounded his European vision in tangible local benefits: EU-funded jobs programs in declining towns, infrastructure projects co-branded with local authorities, and national narratives about how Europe improves daily life for ordinary French citizens.
VI. Absence of a Cultural or Emotional Narrative
Macron’s politics were high on logic and low on myth. He spoke of modernization, efficiency, and reason. But citizens crave identity, meaning, and story.
The Mistake: He failed to craft a compelling emotional or cultural vision of what France could become—a narrative that could unify and inspire.
What He Could Have Done: Macron could have revived a sense of collective national purpose, emphasizing themes like resilience, shared destiny, and innovation rooted in French identity. Great reformers unite the heart and the mind.
Conclusion: A Cautionary Blueprint
Macron was right that France needed modernization. He was right that traditional parties were exhausted. He was right to seek a new path beyond left and right. But good ideas require careful execution. Without trust, without participation, and without emotional resonance, even the best policies falter.
For future centrist reformers—in France, the U.S., or elsewhere—Macron’s presidency offers a powerful lesson: bold visions must be delivered with empathy, humility, and deep democratic grounding. Technocracy alone cannot substitute for trust. The future must be built with the people, not just for them.
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