Actually Building the Post-Cold War World Order

 

Rebuilding Actually Building the Post-Cold War World Order

I. A Great Idea That Never Was

The post-Cold War world order was one of the great hopes of modern history. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in the West believed that liberal democracy, open markets, international law, and global institutions had not merely won a geopolitical contest, but had revealed themselves as the natural destination of political development. Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis was often reduced into a simpler public myth: history had ended, great-power conflict was obsolete, and economic integration would gradually tame authoritarianism. Fukuyama’s actual argument was more nuanced, but the mood of the era was unmistakable: liberal democracy appeared to have no serious ideological rival.

That hope was not foolish in its moral ambition. A world of open trade, democratic governance, peaceful dispute resolution, and shared prosperity is worth building. The mistake was believing that such a system could be extended to authoritarian regimes without first requiring them to accept the political, legal, and ethical premises on which the system depended.

Funding Global Public Goods

 Humanity faces a growing problem that current institutions may be structurally incapable of solving on their own. Climate change is increasingly revealing itself not merely as a national policy challenge, but as a planetary systems problem. Rising temperatures, ocean acidification, atmospheric instability, biodiversity collapse, intensified droughts, and increasingly volatile weather patterns all suggest that humanity may already be entering a period in which mitigation alone is insufficient. Reducing emissions remains critically important, but reducing the rate of deterioration is not the same thing as repairing damage already done.

The international community has spent decades focused primarily on carbon reduction targets, emissions agreements, and adaptation strategies. These efforts are valuable and necessary. Yet they may not ultimately be enough to restore atmospheric stability. Humanity may need to move beyond merely slowing the damage and begin developing technologies capable of actively repairing planetary systems themselves.

This requires a major shift in how climate policy is conceptualized. Climate change should not only be viewed as a regulatory challenge or a consumption problem. It should increasingly be approached as an engineering and scientific challenge requiring coordinated, long-term, civilization-scale research and development.

Notes on Mechanism to Reduce Inflation Beyond the Federal Reserve

 The Federal Reserve is the United States’ central inflation-fighting institution, but it is not designed to solve every kind of inflation. Its strongest tools—interest rates, balance-sheet policy, and forward guidance—work mainly by influencing aggregate demand, credit conditions, employment, investment, and expectations. Those tools are powerful when inflation comes from overheated demand. They are less precise when inflation comes from a broken supply chain, a war, an embargo, a pandemic, a drought, a port closure, or a sudden shortage of oil, food, or industrial inputs.

That distinction matters because many of the most painful inflation shocks for ordinary households are not broad monetary phenomena at first. They are concentrated in high-visibility essentials: gasoline, electricity, groceries, fertilizer, housing inputs, and manufacturing materials. The Federal Reserve can cool the economy enough to reduce total inflation, but doing so after a supply shock often means suppressing demand across the entire economy to compensate for shortages in a few strategic sectors. That can lower inflation, but at unnecessary cost.

Gonzo-Transcendentalism

 Human history accumulates in layers. Every generation inherits the interpretations of those before it, centuries of philosophy, theology, ideology, and culture piled atop one another until the weight of inherited meaning becomes so great that direct contact with reality feels nearly impossible. To peel those layers back one at a time would take more lifetimes than any of us have. So instead, we go into the woods.

Nature is the one domain that has not been interpreted into abstraction. It simply is. The tree does not know what Aristotle said about it. The river does not carry the freight of human argument. For the original Transcendentalists, Emerson, Thoreau, this was understood as a kind of religious encounter: to stand in nature was to stand in the presence of something unmediated, something true. Going to nature meant going back to the source.

Gonzo-Transcendentalism begins there and takes one step further.

A New Framework for Solving Climate Change

 For decades, the global response to climate change has been organized around two pillars: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; adaptation seeks to manage the consequences of a changing climate. Both are necessary. Neither is sufficient.

We are now confronting a reality that demands a third pillar: repair.

This is not an argument that mitigation has failed, nor that adaptation is futile. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that the scale, persistence, and accumulated nature of climate change have transformed the problem. Climate change is no longer simply a matter of preventing further harm. It is now a matter of actively reversing damage that has already been done.

Humanity has moved from a prevention problem to an engineering problem.

Preserving Human Economic Participation Is Essential for AI Progress

 

Introduction: The Hidden Dependency

Artificial intelligence is often framed as a replacement technology—one that will gradually displace human labor across industries until machines outperform people in most economically valuable tasks. This framing, while intuitive, is incomplete.

It misses a critical structural reality:

Artificial intelligence is not independent of humanity—it is downstream of it.

A More Capable Government at Lower Cost: Rebuilding the American State Without Expanding It

 The United States does not have a spending problem in the way it is often described. It has an efficiency problem.

Each year, the federal government spends trillions of dollars across defense, healthcare, social programs, and administration. The scale of this spending has led to a persistent assumption that meaningful savings require either cutting major programs or raising taxes. But this framing misses a more fundamental issue.

The problem is not simply how much the government spends. It is how effectively that spending is converted into outcomes.

Across the federal government, inefficiencies are embedded in structure, incentives, and execution. These inefficiencies do not exist in a single place. They are distributed across agencies, contracts, processes, and policies. Taken together, they represent one of the largest untapped opportunities for fiscal improvement.

The United States can meaningfully reduce federal spending—not by shrinking the scope of government, but by making it work better.