The American People Have Become the Third Estate

 

In pre-revolutionary France, society was formally divided into three estates. The First Estate—the clergy—and the Second Estate—the nobility—held power, privilege, and influence far beyond their numbers. The Third Estate—everyone else—made up the overwhelming majority of the population, bore the economic burden of the state, and yet had little meaningful political power.

This structure was not merely unequal; it was unstable. It created a system in which those who governed were insulated from the consequences of their decisions, while those who bore the consequences had little ability to influence them. Eventually, the imbalance became intolerable—and the system collapsed.

The United States, of course, is not pre-revolutionary France. But structurally, it is increasingly beginning to resemble it in one critical respect: the American people are becoming the Third Estate.

America First, Not America Alone: What NASA’s Moon Base Teaches Us About Global Leadership

 

There is a persistent tension at the heart of American foreign policy today.

On one hand, the instinct behind “America First” is correct. The United States should prioritize its own security, economic strength, and long-term strategic position. It should not blindly subsidize allies, tolerate asymmetric arrangements, or maintain systems that others exploit at its expense.

On the other hand, the way this instinct has often been operationalized drifts toward something far less sustainable: America Alone.

In a world defined by the rise of China, the persistence of Russia, and the increasing complexity of technological and economic systems, the United States cannot effectively operate in isolation. The scale of modern competition—whether military, economic, or technological—simply exceeds what even a superpower can manage independently.

The problem, then, is not the goal of putting America first. The problem is the lack of a coherent system for doing so.

Ironically, one of the clearest blueprints for resolving this tension is not coming from Washington’s foreign policy establishment, but from NASA.

Notes on Resiliency in American Institutions

 

Upgrading the Republic: Why American Institutions Must Adapt to an Age of Acceleration

The institutions of the United States were designed for durability, not speed.

That was not a flaw—it was the point.

When the Constitution was drafted in 1787, the primary threat to liberty was not stagnation but instability: rapid swings of power, mob rule, and the consolidation of authority in the hands of a few. The solution was a system deliberately engineered to slow things down. Checks and balances, bicameralism, federalism, and staggered elections were not inefficiencies. They were safeguards.

But the world those institutions were designed for no longer exists.

We are now living in an age defined not by stability, but by acceleration.

Technological progress—from the internet to artificial intelligence, from blockchain systems to autonomous machines—is compressing time. Economic shifts that once unfolded over decades now occur in years, sometimes months. Entire industries emerge and collapse within a single business cycle. Information spreads globally in seconds. Financial markets react in milliseconds. And geopolitical dynamics are increasingly shaped by technological capabilities that evolve faster than regulatory or diplomatic frameworks can keep pace.

The core problem is simple: our institutions move at a 19th- and 20th-century speed in a 21st-century world.

The Corruption of the Two Party System

 

The Most Dangerous Threat to American Democracy Isn’t External—It’s the Two-Party System

The greatest threat to American democracy is not a foreign adversary, a single political figure, or even a specific ideology. It is the structure of the system itself—specifically, the entrenched and effectively unbreakable two-party system dominated by the Democratic and Republican parties.

What began as a functional political alignment has hardened into something far more dangerous: a duopoly with aligned incentives to preserve power, monetize dysfunction, and avoid meaningful resolution of the country’s most pressing problems.

The result is not merely polarization. It is a system that increasingly rewards paralysis.

Notes on Corruption in the U.S. Federal Government

 

Updating the Guardrails: Practical Reforms to Reduce Corruption in the U.S. Federal Government

For most of its history, the United States has relied less on rigid anti-corruption laws and more on norms, expectations, and a shared understanding of public service. That approach worked reasonably well when political culture reinforced restraint. But like any system dependent on informal rules, it begins to break down when those norms erode.

That is where the United States finds itself today.

The Western Alliance Needs an Update, Not a Eulogy

 The Western alliance is often described today in one of two ways: either as the triumphant architect of the modern liberal order or as a decaying relic incapable of meeting the demands of the present age. Both descriptions miss the point. The Western alliance is neither finished nor fundamentally broken. It is outdated.

It is best understood not as a failed system, but as a powerful one that has gone too long without a meaningful update. Like a computer or a smartphone that has not received critical software patches, it still functions, but increasingly poorly. Vulnerabilities accumulate. Performance degrades. New threats emerge that it was never designed to handle. Eventually, the issue is not whether the system once worked—it clearly did—but whether it has been properly maintained for the world it now inhabits.

That is where the West finds itself today.

Notes on Solving Biological Death

 

Infinity and Its Consequences

For most of human history, the central constraint on human life has not been intelligence, resources, or even technology—it has been time. Every system we have built, every institution we rely upon, and nearly every decision we make is shaped, either directly or indirectly, by the fact that human beings age and die.

It is therefore tempting to assume that the most transformative technologies in human history will be those that expand what we can do: artificial intelligence, nuclear energy, or space travel. These are undeniably powerful innovations. But they all share a common limitation—they operate within the same fundamental constraint that has always governed human life: its brevity.

The true discontinuity comes not from expanding human capability within a fixed lifespan, but from removing the limit altogether. The effective end of biological aging—universally available to all—would not simply improve the human condition. It would redefine it.

Notes on Childcare Policy

 Modern social safety nets—such as public pensions, healthcare systems, and unemployment insurance—rest on a simple premise: today’s workers fund the benefits of today’s retirees and vulnerable populations. This pay-as-you-go structure has proven resilient in many countries, but it carries a built-in dependency: the system requires a steady stream of working-age taxpayers to sustain it. Without demographic renewal, the tax base erodes, the fiscal burden rises, and the viability of social welfare programs comes under strain.

Yet fertility rates across the developed world have fallen below replacement level, creating a demographic imbalance that threatens the long-term solvency of these systems. Governments have attempted to address this problem through child tax credits, childcare subsidies, and parental leave, but these interventions are often temporary, fragmented, or overly rigid. They tend to expire once children reach adulthood, even though the public value of those children—as future workers, taxpayers, and contributors to social insurance systems—continues for decades.

A Market-Oriented Approach to Childcare: Expanding Access, Reducing Friction, and Supporting Working Families

 Across the developed world, fertility rates have declined below replacement levels while the cost of raising children—particularly the cost of childcare—has risen significantly. At the same time, modern economies increasingly depend on dual-income households and high labor force participation to sustain economic growth and support public finances. These trends have created a growing tension at the center of family life: the desire to have children exists alongside structural barriers that make doing so financially and logistically difficult.

Among these barriers, childcare stands out as one of the most immediate and consequential. It is not only expensive, but often inflexible, geographically uneven, and poorly aligned with the realities of modern work. For many families, especially those with young children, childcare represents one of the largest recurring expenses they face. In some cases, it rivals housing costs. In others, the unpredictability of care availability creates as much strain as its price.

Capitalism as Violence Reduction

 

Capitalism, Democracy, and the Nonviolent Pursuit of Human Ambition

For most of human history, the path to material improvement ran through power—and power was often obtained through violence.

In small-scale hunter-gatherer societies, status and resource access depended on physical dominance, coalition-building, or direct confrontation. In early agrarian and “palace” economies, political and economic power were fused: kings, priestly elites, and ruling classes controlled land, labor, and surplus. Advancement required proximity to—or seizure of—political authority. In monarchies and empires, upward mobility often depended on military success, court intrigue, or rebellion. Across these systems, the same structural reality persisted: to improve one’s material conditions, one typically had to acquire political power, and political power was ultimately backed by coercion.

Modern liberal democratic capitalism represents a historically unusual departure from this pattern. At its best—when supported by strong institutions and effective regulation—it partially separates economic power from political power. This separation has profound implications. It creates a system in which individuals can pursue status, wealth, and improved living standards without needing to control the state, thereby reducing the incentives for violent competition.

Stargate SG1: Pegasus

The Stargate Reboot Is a Missed Opportunity — The Real Show We Should Get Instead

There is a temptation in modern television that is as understandable as it is misguided: when something worked in the past, remake it.

This instinct appears to be driving renewed interest in rebooting Stargate SG-1. On paper, it makes sense. SG-1 is one of the most successful and beloved science fiction shows ever made. It ran for ten seasons, spawned multiple spin-offs, and continues to perform remarkably well in syndication and on streaming platforms like Netflix. New viewers are still discovering it. Old fans are still rewatching it.

But that is precisely why rebooting it is a mistake.

You do not reboot something that is still alive.

You build on it.