Beyond Containment: The Case for Strategic Coexistence with China

 

Toward a New American Grand Strategy for an Era of Great-Power Competition

Introduction: The End of an Era in American Foreign Policy

For much of the past half-century, American foreign policy toward China has been organized around a fundamental question: How should the United States manage China's rise?

That question reflected an international environment in which the United States possessed overwhelming economic, technological, and military advantages, while China was only beginning its transformation from an impoverished, largely isolated country into a major participant in the global economy. Washington could reasonably believe that it possessed considerable influence over the terms of China's integration into the international system.

The strategic assumptions underlying that approach have become increasingly obsolete.

China is no longer a rising power whose emergence can be meaningfully managed by the United States. It is already an established great power, possessing the world's second-largest economy at market exchange rates, formidable industrial capabilities, a rapidly modernizing military, and an expanding technological and diplomatic presence. Its economic importance, demographic scale, and historical identity ensure that it will remain a central participant in international affairs, even as it confronts substantial domestic challenges.

The United States retains enormous advantages. Its alliances, financial institutions, universities, technological ecosystem, geographic position, and capacity for innovation provide enduring sources of national strength. Yet these advantages no longer confer the ability to determine China's political development or dictate the conditions of its participation in international affairs.

The era in which Washington could plausibly seek to manage China's rise has passed.

American strategy must therefore evolve from attempting to shape China's emergence toward establishing the conditions under which the United States and China can coexist as powerful, competing nations.

This requires a fundamental reconsideration of the relationship between political ideology, economic competition, national security, and international order.

The central diplomatic challenge of the twenty-first century is not to make China more like the United States, nor to compel the United States to accommodate every Chinese ambition. It is to construct an international order in which countries with fundamentally different political systems can pursue their interests peacefully, compete fairly, and resolve disputes without resorting to coercion or war.

Such an order would not eliminate geopolitical rivalry. Nor would it require either nation to abandon its values, alliances, or legitimate national interests.

It would instead recognize a principle that has been essential to international stability throughout history: peaceful coexistence does not require agreement about political philosophy. It requires agreement about the rules and limits of international competition.

I. From Managing China's Rise to Managing Strategic Coexistence

The modern American approach to China emerged from the strategic circumstances of the Cold War.

When President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger initiated the opening to China in the early 1970s, their immediate objective was not to democratize Chinese society or integrate China into a liberal international order. It was to exploit the strategic division between Beijing and Moscow, thereby improving America's position in the global balance of power.

The opening demonstrated that countries with profoundly different political systems could establish productive diplomatic relationships when their interests sufficiently overlapped.

The United States did not recognize the legitimacy of communist ideology by engaging China. Nor did China embrace American constitutional democracy by cooperating with Washington.

Both governments recognized that diplomatic relations could serve important national interests despite fundamental ideological disagreements.

Over subsequent decades, however, American policy gradually incorporated a broader expectation: that China's integration into global markets and international institutions would encourage economic liberalization, political moderation, and eventually some degree of convergence with the existing international order.

China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 represented a major milestone in this process.

The economic consequences were profound. China became a central participant in global manufacturing, international trade, and increasingly sophisticated technological industries. Hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens escaped extreme poverty during the country's reform era, while American consumers and businesses benefited from lower-cost goods, expanded markets, and integrated supply chains.

Yet economic integration did not produce the political transformation that some American policymakers anticipated.

Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has strengthened its control over political institutions, expanded state influence over important sectors of the economy, and increasingly emphasized national security and political discipline.

Rather than converging toward Western political institutions, China has developed a model combining extensive market activity, industrial policy, technological ambition, and centralized one-party rule.

The failure of political convergence does not mean that engagement was entirely misguided. Economic integration generated substantial benefits, and a more isolated China might have developed in ways equally or more threatening to American interests.

But it does reveal the limitations of a strategy that implicitly treated economic modernization as a pathway toward political similarity.

China's political future will ultimately be determined primarily by developments within China, not by American expectations.

The United States can influence Beijing's incentives, constrain coercive behavior, and defend its own interests. It cannot reliably engineer the internal evolution of Chinese governance.

American strategy must begin by acknowledging that distinction.

The relevant question is no longer whether China can be integrated into an American-led system on American terms. It is whether the United States, China, and other major powers can negotiate and sustain rules governing their competition without requiring political convergence.

II. Political Difference Need Not Produce International Conflict

One of the most consequential mistakes in international relations is the assumption that countries with different political systems must inevitably become enemies.

Political institutions matter. They shape national priorities, perceptions of legitimacy, decision-making processes, and the treatment of citizens.

Yet political difference alone does not make peaceful relations impossible.

History offers numerous examples of countries with divergent domestic systems cooperating when their interests aligned. The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated arms-control agreements despite their ideological confrontation. Democratic and authoritarian governments have maintained diplomatic relations, participated in international institutions, and concluded mutually beneficial economic agreements.

The critical distinction is between how a government organizes its domestic political system and how it conducts itself internationally.

The United States need not approve of China's one-party political system to recognize China's sovereignty. China need not endorse American democracy to respect American political independence.

Neither government should make the transformation of the other's domestic institutions a prerequisite for stable relations.

This principle does not require moral relativism.

The United States can continue defending universal human rights, criticizing political repression, and supporting democratic values. It can also restrict involvement in abuses and protect individuals threatened by transnational repression.

But it should distinguish between expressing its principles and making the overthrow or transformation of another major power's government an organizing objective of its foreign policy.

A strategy that implicitly depends upon the eventual disappearance of the Chinese Communist Party creates an enduring source of insecurity in Beijing. Conversely, a Chinese strategy that seeks to undermine democratic institutions abroad or impose political conditions upon other countries would make stable coexistence substantially more difficult.

Both governments must recognize that the political independence of the other is a permanent feature of the international environment.

An international order capable of sustaining peace must be sufficiently pluralistic to accommodate different domestic political systems, while sufficiently principled to prohibit coercion, aggression, and violations of international commitments.

This is not an argument that all political systems are equally desirable.

It is an argument that the legitimacy of international rules cannot depend entirely upon agreement about the legitimacy of domestic institutions.

The international system must provide a framework within which political differences can persist without becoming a permanent justification for conflict.

III. Truly Fair Trade as the Economic Foundation of Coexistence

Economic relations are among the most important and potentially productive dimensions of the American-Chinese relationship.

They are also among its greatest sources of friction.

For decades, the expansion of trade between the United States and China was frequently defended through the proposition that economic interdependence would produce mutual benefits and reduce the likelihood of geopolitical confrontation.

That proposition was partly correct.

American consumers gained access to inexpensive manufactured goods. American businesses developed extensive production networks and reached new markets. China benefited from foreign investment, technological exchange, and access to global demand.

Yet aggregate economic gains did not guarantee that the benefits were distributed equally, or that competition occurred under genuinely reciprocal conditions.

American workers and communities experienced substantial disruption from import competition, although automation, domestic policy choices, and broader structural changes also contributed to manufacturing employment losses.

American businesses encountered restrictions on market access, concerns over intellectual property protection, preferential treatment for domestic competitors, and the influence of Chinese industrial policy.

Meanwhile, Chinese policymakers have criticized American tariffs, export controls, investment restrictions, and industrial subsidies as discriminatory efforts to preserve American economic dominance.

A sustainable economic relationship cannot rest upon the expectation that either country will indefinitely accept arrangements it considers fundamentally unfair.

Nor can it depend upon requiring China to adopt the American economic model.

The United States and China have different relationships between government and industry. Both use industrial policies, subsidies, procurement preferences, and national security restrictions, although their scale, transparency, and institutional characteristics differ substantially.

The objective should not be identical economic systems.

It should be genuinely fair competition.

Reciprocity rather than uniformity

Fair trade should be understood as a system of reciprocal rights and obligations.

If Chinese firms can invest in an American industry, American firms should ordinarily have comparable opportunities in China, subject to legitimate and clearly defined security exceptions.

If American businesses are expected to compete without discriminatory regulatory barriers, Chinese businesses should receive equivalent treatment in the United States.

If one country restricts foreign ownership or market participation, the other should have transparent procedures for negotiating reciprocal access rather than relying indefinitely upon unilateral retaliation.

Reciprocity does not necessarily require identical regulations. Countries differ in their legal traditions, economic structures, and legitimate public objectives.

It does require that differences not become systematic instruments of economic discrimination.

Industrial subsidies and competitive neutrality

One of the most difficult challenges involves government support for domestic industries.

China's use of industrial subsidies, preferential financing, state-owned enterprises, and coordinated industrial policy has raised serious concerns about competitive distortions in global markets.

When firms receive substantial support unrelated to commercial performance, competitors operating under different conditions may struggle to survive even when they are otherwise efficient.

Yet the United States has also embraced major industrial initiatives, including subsidies for semiconductor manufacturing and clean-energy technologies.

A credible American argument for fair competition must therefore be based upon principles applicable to both countries.

Those principles should include greater transparency concerning industrial assistance, limits on particularly distortive subsidies, protections against coercive technology transfer, and mechanisms for addressing demonstrable injury to foreign competitors.

The distinction should not simply be between Chinese government intervention and American market activity.

It should be between legitimate public policy and practices that undermine agreed standards of international competition.

Intellectual property and technological competition

Innovation is central to the future prosperity of both nations.

American universities, entrepreneurs, and research institutions remain important sources of technological development. China has also become a major innovator in fields including electric vehicles, batteries, telecommunications, renewable energy, and advanced manufacturing.

A stable trading system must protect the incentives that make innovation possible.

Technology transfer should occur through voluntary agreements, licensing, investment, and commercial exchange—not coercion, cyber-enabled theft, or discriminatory regulatory requirements.

At the same time, neither country should expect to maintain a permanent monopoly over technologies that the other can legitimately develop.

The objective should be to reward innovation, prevent theft, and preserve fair competition rather than suppress technological progress abroad.

Fair trade must be enforceable

The central weakness of many international economic arrangements is not the absence of principles but the difficulty of enforcing them.

A new American-Chinese economic framework would require credible procedures for investigating alleged violations, adjudicating disputes, and authorizing proportionate remedies.

The World Trade Organization provides an institutional foundation, but its rules and dispute-resolution mechanisms require reform to address contemporary challenges involving industrial subsidies, state capitalism, digital trade, and national security exceptions.

Such reforms would be more legitimate if developed multilaterally rather than imposed through a bilateral agreement between Washington and Beijing.

Truly fair trade cannot mean that the United States writes the rules and China follows them. Nor can it mean that China uses the international market while exempting itself from reciprocal obligations. It must mean that both countries accept common standards, including when those standards constrain their own behavior.

This is essential not only for economic prosperity but for political stability.

When citizens believe that international trade systematically disadvantages them, support for openness deteriorates. Protectionism becomes politically attractive, economic disputes acquire nationalistic significance, and commercial competition increasingly becomes a matter of geopolitical confrontation.

Fair trade is therefore not merely an economic objective.

It is one of the foundations of peaceful coexistence.

IV. Competition Without Confrontation

The United States and China will remain competitors even under the most successful framework of strategic coexistence.

Their economies are too large, their technological ambitions too extensive, and their security interests too consequential for competition to disappear.

But competition is not inherently destructive.

Within properly functioning markets, competition encourages innovation, efficiency, and adaptation. In international affairs, competition can similarly encourage countries to improve their institutions, strengthen their economies, and develop new technologies.

The danger emerges when competition becomes an unrestricted struggle for dominance.

If Washington assumes that every Chinese technological advance represents an American defeat, it risks adopting increasingly expansive restrictions that damage its own economy and alienate international partners.

If Beijing assumes that every American alliance, commercial initiative, or diplomatic engagement represents an attempt to contain China, it risks interpreting ordinary international competition as a direct threat to its security.

These perceptions can become mutually reinforcing.

American restrictions encourage Chinese efforts toward technological self-sufficiency. Chinese industrial and military advances encourage additional American restrictions. Each side interprets the other's defensive measures as evidence of hostile intentions.

The result can become a security dilemma in which actions intended to increase national security inadvertently make both countries less secure.

Strategic coexistence requires distinguishing among legitimate competition, necessary cooperation, and fundamental security disputes.

In commercial industries where security risks are limited, competition should generally remain open.

In areas of shared interest—including pandemic preparedness, financial stability, climate change, nuclear safety, and certain scientific endeavors—cooperation should be pursued when practical.

In sensitive technologies and military capabilities, both countries may reasonably maintain restrictions designed to protect national security.

But those restrictions should be proportionate, clearly justified, and sufficiently limited to avoid transforming the entire economic relationship into an instrument of confrontation.

A policy of indiscriminate economic decoupling would be extraordinarily costly and difficult to sustain.

It would also encourage other countries to choose sides in a rivalry many would prefer to avoid.

The better approach is selective risk reduction: protecting genuinely critical technologies and supply chains while preserving mutually beneficial commerce wherever possible.

This requires discipline from both governments.

Not every commercial advantage is a national security threat. Not every technological breakthrough is a geopolitical crisis. Not every diplomatic disagreement must become a test of national prestige.

The purpose of strategic coexistence is not to end competition, but to prevent competition from becoming an existential struggle.

V. Military Deterrence and the Limits of Strategic Accommodation

Economic cooperation and diplomatic engagement cannot substitute for credible military deterrence.

The United States and China possess competing security interests, particularly in East Asia.

China's growing military capabilities have altered the regional balance of power, while the United States maintains longstanding alliances and security commitments with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and other partners.

Taiwan represents the most dangerous potential flashpoint.

Beijing considers Taiwan part of China and has not renounced the use of force to achieve unification. Taiwan maintains its own democratic political system and armed forces, and its population possesses distinct political preferences concerning its future.

The United States maintains a longstanding one-China policy, does not recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state, and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.

A viable strategy of coexistence must recognize that the Taiwan question cannot simply be resolved through general appeals to mutual respect.

The parties disagree about sovereignty, political legitimacy, and acceptable outcomes.

These disagreements may persist for decades.

The immediate strategic objective should therefore be to prevent unilateral coercion or military action from determining Taiwan's future.

That requires preserving credible deterrence, discouraging provocative unilateral changes, maintaining channels of communication, and supporting peaceful approaches consistent with the interests and security of the people directly affected.

Strategic coexistence must not become a euphemism for accepting spheres of influence in which powerful countries possess unrestricted authority over their neighbors.

Such an arrangement would undermine the sovereignty of smaller states and encourage further coercion.

Nor should the United States treat its military presence in Asia as an instrument for permanently denying China any legitimate regional influence.

The challenge is to establish a regional equilibrium in which China's security interests are recognized without sacrificing the independence and security of other countries.

This balance will be difficult.

But difficulty does not make confrontation inevitable.

Military-to-military communication, maritime incident agreements, crisis hotlines, nuclear-risk discussions, and confidence-building measures can reduce the probability that accidents or misunderstandings escalate into war.

The Cold War demonstrated that even deeply antagonistic nuclear powers could develop mechanisms for managing strategic risks.

The United States and China should seek to improve upon that experience rather than repeat its most dangerous episodes.

VI. A Legitimate International Order Cannot Be Built by Two Countries Alone

Although the American-Chinese relationship will be central to twenty-first-century geopolitics, the international order cannot legitimately be reduced to an agreement between Washington and Beijing.

Other countries possess independent interests, identities, and political choices.

India, Japan, the European Union, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, and numerous other nations will shape the future distribution of economic and political influence.

Many do not wish to participate in an exclusive American or Chinese sphere.

They seek access to both markets, freedom to develop their own diplomatic relationships, and protection against coercion by more powerful states.

A strategy of coexistence must therefore avoid becoming a great-power condominium in which Washington and Beijing divide the world into privileged zones of influence.

Such an arrangement might temporarily reduce direct American-Chinese friction, but it would undermine the legitimacy of the broader international system.

Smaller countries would reasonably fear that their sovereignty could be negotiated away without their consent.

A more durable order would rest upon principles that apply regardless of national power.

These include respect for sovereignty, the prohibition of aggressive war, freedom of navigation consistent with international law, peaceful dispute resolution, reciprocal economic obligations, and the protection of international agreements.

The United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other multilateral institutions provide existing foundations.

These institutions are imperfect. Their governance structures reflect historical compromises, and many require reform to remain effective and representative.

But replacing them with an exclusively bilateral system would be neither desirable nor realistic.

The United States should recognize that legitimate demands for greater representation by China and other developing economies do not necessarily threaten American interests.

China, in turn, should recognize that greater international influence carries corresponding obligations to support institutional independence, transparency, and rules that constrain powerful states as well as weaker ones.

The objective should not be to preserve every feature of the postwar international order unchanged.

It should be to adapt that order without abandoning the principles that have contributed to international stability.

A legitimate international order must recognize differences in power without making power itself the ultimate source of legitimacy.

VII. The Importance of Domestic Strength

Strategic coexistence should not be confused with American retreat.

Indeed, its success depends in substantial part upon the United States maintaining the economic, technological, military, and institutional strength necessary to negotiate from a position of confidence.

A country that believes its prosperity and security are rapidly deteriorating is more likely to interpret international competition as an existential threat.

Conversely, a country confident in its ability to innovate, grow, and defend its interests can afford to approach competitors with greater patience and flexibility.

For the United States, this means that domestic renewal must become a central component of foreign policy.

Investments in scientific research, infrastructure, education, energy systems, advanced manufacturing, and technological innovation will do more to preserve American competitiveness over the long term than attempts to obstruct every Chinese advance.

The United States should also address its fiscal trajectory, improve the effectiveness of public institutions, and preserve the openness that has historically attracted talented individuals and entrepreneurs from around the world.

America's enduring advantages are not merely the product of military power.

They arise from its capacity for innovation, its deep capital markets, its network of alliances, its universities, its geographic position, and the adaptability of its political and economic institutions.

These strengths should be cultivated rather than taken for granted.

The United States does not need China to fail in order to succeed.

Indeed, a prosperous China operating within fair international rules could provide significant economic opportunities for American businesses, workers, and consumers.

The more important objective is to ensure that American prosperity does not depend upon Chinese political weakness, and that Chinese prosperity does not depend upon the erosion of American power.

This distinction is fundamental.

A strategy premised upon the eventual economic or political collapse of China is inherently speculative. It also creates incentives for Beijing to regard American policy as an existential threat.

A strategy premised upon American renewal is more sustainable because its success depends primarily upon choices within American control.

The strongest foundation for strategic coexistence is not the weakness of one's rival, but confidence in one's own capacity to prosper.

VIII. From Balance of Power to an Equilibrium of Mutual Restraint

Henry Kissinger's writings on international order emphasized that durable stability requires more than a distribution of military capabilities.

It also requires some shared conception of legitimacy: an understanding among major powers about which actions and arrangements are permissible, even when they disagree about broader political ideals.

This distinction is especially relevant to the American-Chinese relationship.

A balance of power can discourage aggression by making conflict costly. But power alone cannot resolve disagreements about sovereignty, trade, technological competition, or the legitimacy of international institutions.

A stable order must therefore combine deterrence with accepted rules.

The United States and China need not agree about which political system is superior.

They need not share the same interpretation of history, national identity, or economic organization.

They do, however, need some agreement about the conduct of international competition.

Military force should not be used to resolve ordinary political disputes. Economic interdependence should not become an unrestricted instrument of coercion. Commercial competition should operate under reciprocal standards. Diplomatic disagreements should be addressed through institutions and negotiation wherever possible.

Both countries must also recognize the dangers of seeking absolute security.

If the United States attempts to eliminate every possible source of Chinese strategic influence, China will perceive an enduring threat regardless of its actual conduct.

If China attempts to remove American influence from East Asia through coercion, the United States and its regional partners will respond with increasingly intensive efforts to balance Chinese power.

The pursuit of absolute security by either side can therefore produce greater insecurity for both.

A more sustainable objective is an equilibrium of mutual restraint.

Such an equilibrium would not require trust in the personal goodwill of national leaders.

It would instead rely upon credible commitments, reciprocal incentives, enforceable agreements, and institutions designed to function even when relations deteriorate.

This is particularly important given the concentration of political power in China and the possibility of abrupt changes in American political leadership.

A durable framework should not depend upon the personal relationship between an American president and a Chinese leader.

It should be sufficiently institutionalized to survive leadership transitions, domestic political disagreements, and periods of heightened tension.

The ultimate test of strategic coexistence is not whether the two countries can cooperate when relations are good.

It is whether they can manage disagreements peacefully when relations are bad.

IX. A Practical Roadmap Toward Strategic Coexistence

The philosophical case for coexistence must ultimately translate into concrete diplomatic arrangements.

The United States should pursue a gradual, reciprocal strategy built around verifiable commitments rather than sweeping declarations of friendship.

The first priority should be reducing the risk of military conflict.

This would involve reliable military communication channels, protocols for dangerous encounters at sea and in the air, mechanisms for managing crises involving Taiwan, and renewed discussions concerning nuclear stability.

These arrangements would not resolve underlying territorial or political disagreements. They would reduce the probability that those disagreements produce catastrophic miscalculations.

The second priority should be negotiating a more credible framework for fair trade.

Rather than attempting to resolve every economic dispute simultaneously, the two governments could begin with clearly defined areas where reciprocal commitments are possible: intellectual property enforcement, market access in selected sectors, subsidy transparency, and protections against coercive technology transfer.

Agreements should include measurable obligations, independent monitoring where feasible, and proportionate remedies for violations.

The third priority should be establishing clearer boundaries around economic security.

Both governments should identify categories of technologies and infrastructure requiring special protection while avoiding excessively broad restrictions that undermine ordinary commerce.

The objective should be to make national security exceptions more predictable and less vulnerable to opportunistic expansion.

The fourth priority should be strengthening multilateral institutions.

The United States should work with allies, China, and other major economies to modernize international trade rules, improve dispute settlement, and increase the credibility of institutions responsible for managing global economic and financial stability.

The fifth priority should be expanding cooperation on problems that cannot be solved effectively by either country acting alone.

Pandemic preparedness, nuclear proliferation, financial crises, environmental challenges, and certain applications of artificial intelligence all present opportunities for practical cooperation.

These efforts should be pursued without requiring agreement on unrelated political disputes.

Finally, both countries should develop a sustained diplomatic process for reviewing their strategic relationship.

Regular discussions among senior officials, supported by working groups with defined responsibilities, could help identify emerging sources of friction before they develop into crises.

Progress would likely be uneven.

Some negotiations would fail. Certain disagreements might remain unresolved indefinitely.

But the purpose of the process would not be to produce an ideal relationship.

It would be to create a relationship in which disagreements can be managed without threatening the entire international system.

X. The Alternative: An Unnecessary and Potentially Catastrophic Rivalry

The consequences of failing to establish a workable framework for coexistence could be severe.

The United States and China are deeply integrated into the global economy, possess advanced military capabilities, and occupy central positions in international diplomacy.

A prolonged confrontation could accelerate economic fragmentation, weaken international institutions, divert resources toward military competition, and force smaller countries into increasingly difficult strategic choices.

A direct military conflict could be catastrophic, particularly given the risks of escalation between nuclear-armed powers.

Yet the dangers extend beyond war.

An international environment dominated by unrestricted American-Chinese rivalry could undermine global economic growth, discourage scientific cooperation, complicate responses to international crises, and erode the institutional foundations of peaceful commerce.

Neither country would necessarily benefit from such an outcome.

China's economic development remains dependent in important respects upon international markets, access to resources, technological progress, and a stable external environment.

The United States benefits from global trade, open financial systems, secure alliances, and international institutions that reduce the costs of maintaining peace.

Both countries therefore possess powerful interests in preventing competition from becoming comprehensive confrontation.

This does not guarantee that they will act upon those interests.

History demonstrates that states can pursue policies that undermine their own long-term security, particularly when nationalism, domestic political incentives, misperception, or excessive confidence distort decision-making.

The purpose of diplomacy is partly to prevent those tendencies from determining international outcomes.

Strategic coexistence should therefore be understood not as an expression of optimism about Chinese intentions or American intentions, but as a practical response to the dangers of unconstrained great-power rivalry.

The alternatives are not limited to domination and surrender.

There is a third possibility: sustained competition within a mutually recognized framework of restraint.

Conclusion: The Necessity of a New American Grand Strategy

The United States has entered a period in which its relationship with China will profoundly influence the future of international politics.

But the central strategic question has changed.

For decades, Washington asked how it could manage China's rise and encourage its integration into an international system largely constructed under American leadership.

China has now risen.

Its economic, military, and technological capabilities have made it an enduring great power. Its political institutions remain fundamentally different from those of the United States, and there is little reason to assume that these differences will disappear in the foreseeable future.

American strategy must adapt to this reality.

The United States should neither attempt to remake China in its own image nor concede that Chinese power entitles Beijing to disregard the sovereignty and legitimate interests of other countries.

It should instead seek a durable framework of strategic coexistence.

Such a framework would recognize the permanence of political differences while establishing common rules for international behavior. It would preserve competition while preventing rivalry from becoming existential. It would encourage truly fair and reciprocal trade while protecting legitimate national security interests. It would maintain credible deterrence while developing institutions capable of preventing military miscalculation.

Above all, it would recognize that the international order cannot remain stable if its legitimacy depends upon one great power permanently subordinating the other.

The United States should continue defending its democratic institutions, investing in its economic future, strengthening its alliances, and preserving its military capabilities.

China should be expected to respect international law, honor reciprocal economic commitments, and pursue its interests without coercively denying other countries their political independence.

Neither nation must abandon its national ambitions.

Both must recognize limits upon the means through which those ambitions are pursued.

The international system must also remain open to the participation and influence of other countries, whose sovereignty and prosperity cannot become bargaining chips in a bilateral great-power settlement.

The central insight is ultimately straightforward.

Peaceful coexistence does not require the United States and China to agree about how societies should be governed. It requires them to agree that their disagreements do not justify unrestricted economic coercion, military aggression, or the destruction of the international institutions upon which their prosperity depends.

The objective of American foreign policy should therefore not be to defeat China, contain every dimension of its influence, or await its political transformation.

It should be to preserve American strength while constructing an international order in which China, the United States, and other nations can compete, cooperate, and prosper under rules that constrain them all.

The great diplomatic achievement of the twenty-first century would not be an American victory over China, or a Chinese victory over the United States. It would be the creation of a durable international equilibrium in which neither victory is necessary for peace.

That is the promise of strategic coexistence—and the challenge that should define the next generation of American grand strategy.