The Economic Foundations of American Power: A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century

 

Why the United States must prioritize economic strength as the foundation of national security, geopolitical influence, and enduring global leadership

Introduction: The Foundations of National Power

The United States confronts a strategic challenge that will define its position in the twenty-first century. The international system is entering an era of renewed great-power competition, characterized by China's emergence as a peer economic competitor, Russia's determination to revise the European security order, accelerating technological change, and growing uncertainty about the durability of the institutions that have sustained American leadership since the Second World War. In responding to these challenges, American policymakers have understandably emphasized military modernization, alliance commitments, technological competition, and the preservation of a favorable balance of power. Yet these priorities, however important, risk obscuring a more fundamental principle: the ultimate foundation of national power is economic strength.

Military capabilities protect national interests, diplomacy advances them, and alliances multiply a country's influence. But economic strength supplies the resources that make all three possible. A nation cannot indefinitely sustain military superiority, diplomatic influence, or extensive international commitments if the productive capacity of its economy fails to keep pace with its ambitions. The ability to generate wealth, develop new technologies, attract human talent, finance public institutions, and adapt to changing circumstances ultimately determines the range of strategic choices available to a country.

The central objective of American grand strategy should therefore be neither the permanent containment of China nor the indefinite military management of the international system. It should be the preservation and expansion of the United States' economic foundations of power. Rather than defining American success primarily through the weakening of geopolitical competitors, the United States should seek to prevail through the continuous strengthening of its own economy, institutions, and productive capabilities.

This approach does not diminish the importance of military deterrence or international alliances. On the contrary, it recognizes that their long-term effectiveness depends upon a strong and adaptable domestic economy. It also offers a more sustainable response to the rise of China, a more disciplined framework for evaluating international commitments, and a clearer connection between American prosperity at home and American influence abroad.

The essential strategic principle is straightforward: the United States should organize its national security and foreign policy around the preservation of its long-term economic dynamism, recognizing that enduring geopolitical power ultimately rests upon the ability of a society to produce, innovate, and prosper.

I. The Historical Relationship Between Economic Strength and National Power

History demonstrates that the durability of great-power influence depends heavily upon the economic foundations supporting it. Military strength can secure victories, deter adversaries, and establish favorable political arrangements, but sustaining such advantages over decades requires a productive economic system capable of continually replenishing national resources.

The United States' emergence as the preeminent global power during the twentieth century illustrates this relationship. American victory in the Second World War depended not simply upon military courage or strategic leadership, but upon an extraordinary industrial and economic mobilization. The United States produced enormous quantities of aircraft, ships, vehicles, weapons, fuel, and other supplies while simultaneously supporting allied war efforts. Its manufacturing capacity, transportation networks, financial resources, and technological capabilities transformed economic strength into decisive military power.

The American economy did more than support the war effort. It enabled the United States to emerge from the conflict with the resources necessary to shape the postwar international order. American economic strength supported the Marshall Plan, the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan, the creation of international financial institutions, and the establishment of a network of security alliances. The resulting international system reflected not only American military predominance but also the attractiveness and productive capacity of the American economic model.

The Cold War reinforced the importance of this relationship. The Soviet Union possessed a formidable military establishment, advanced scientific capabilities, and a nuclear arsenal capable of devastating the United States. Yet its economic system struggled to match the productivity, innovation, consumer prosperity, and adaptability of the advanced market economies.

The Soviet collapse cannot be attributed exclusively to economic weakness. Political legitimacy, institutional rigidity, nationalist pressures, ideological exhaustion, and decisions by Soviet leaders all played important roles. Nevertheless, economic stagnation constrained the Soviet Union's ability to sustain its domestic system and international commitments. Military parity in selected domains could not compensate indefinitely for weaknesses in the broader economic foundation of Soviet power.

The lesson is not that the wealthiest country invariably wins every geopolitical contest. History contains numerous examples of economically powerful states suffering military defeats or strategic reverses. Rather, the lesson is that economic strength determines the resources available to pursue national objectives, the capacity to absorb setbacks, and the ability to sustain competition over extended periods.

A country may temporarily exercise influence disproportionate to its economic capacity. It cannot reliably sustain such influence indefinitely.

This distinction is especially important for the United States today. American policymakers should not confuse the possession of extraordinary military capabilities with the existence of unlimited strategic resources. The military establishment, intelligence services, diplomatic institutions, and alliance commitments of the United States all depend upon an underlying economy capable of supporting them.

Preserving that economy must therefore be understood as the first responsibility of American grand strategy.

II. The Competition with China Is Fundamentally a Competition of Economic Systems

China's rise represents the most consequential structural change in the international balance of power since the end of the Cold War. Its transformation from a relatively poor, predominantly agricultural society into a major industrial, technological, and commercial power has altered the distribution of global economic influence.

The United States must recognize that China's emergence as a major power is not a temporary deviation from an otherwise stable international order. It is, in important respects, the reemergence of a historically influential civilization into a global system it did not originally design. The United States can influence China's strategic choices, protect its own interests, and shape the institutions governing international competition. It cannot reasonably expect to reverse China's economic development or permanently prevent it from exercising influence commensurate with its capabilities.

This reality requires a distinction between managing China's rise and managing the consequences of its rise. The former implies that the United States can determine China's ultimate position in the international system. The latter recognizes that China has already become a major economic and geopolitical power and that American strategy must accommodate this reality without surrendering vital interests.

The most sustainable American response is to preserve the economic dynamism that has historically constituted its greatest competitive advantage.

China possesses enormous manufacturing capabilities, extensive infrastructure, a large pool of technically trained workers, and substantial expertise in strategically important industries. Its advances in electric vehicles, batteries, telecommunications, renewable energy, and other technologies demonstrate that American policymakers cannot assume a permanent technological advantage.

At the same time, China faces substantial structural challenges. Demographic aging, low fertility, property-sector difficulties, accumulated debt, uneven household consumption, and the natural slowdown associated with economic maturation complicate its long-term growth prospects. The concentration of political power under Xi Jinping may introduce additional risks by weakening institutional feedback, discouraging independent judgment, and increasing the influence of political considerations over economic decisions.

These challenges do not guarantee Chinese stagnation. China retains considerable productive capacity, technological sophistication, and potential for further development. But they underscore an important point: the future balance of economic power is not predetermined.

The United States possesses its own advantages, including deep capital markets, leading research universities, entrepreneurial institutions, substantial natural resources, the ability to attract international talent, and a relatively decentralized system of innovation.

The strategic task is to preserve and expand these advantages.

American policymakers should concentrate on increasing productivity, accelerating innovation, improving infrastructure, strengthening education, facilitating investment, and preserving competitive markets. These objectives would enhance American prosperity regardless of China's economic trajectory.

Indeed, the United States does not need China to become poorer for Americans to become richer. International economic relationships are not uniformly zero-sum. Trade, technological exchange, investment, and specialization can create benefits for both countries, even while they compete in strategically sensitive sectors.

A policy that sacrifices substantial American economic opportunities merely to impose economic costs upon China may weaken the United States alongside its competitor. Such measures can be justified when they protect vital national security interests, but they should not become substitutes for domestic economic development.

The objective should be to maintain American economic and technological leadership where possible, preserve strategic parity where necessary, and ensure that the United States remains sufficiently productive and adaptable to compete successfully over generations.

The most important arena of this competition will not be any single military theater. It will be the cumulative performance of the two economies over the coming decades.

III. Economic Dynamism as America's Principal Strategic Advantage

The United States' greatest long-term advantage lies not in any particular industry, technology, or resource, but in its capacity for economic renewal.

Throughout American history, technological and organizational transformations have repeatedly reshaped the country's economic foundations. Agriculture gave way to industrial manufacturing as a dominant source of employment. Manufacturing was joined by sophisticated service industries, information technology, advanced research, and new forms of entrepreneurship. Each transformation created disruption, but also new opportunities for productivity growth and wealth creation.

This adaptability is especially important in an era of rapid technological change.

Artificial intelligence, robotics, biotechnology, advanced materials, energy technologies, and computing may fundamentally alter economic production during the twenty-first century. Countries that successfully develop and deploy these technologies could experience substantial improvements in productivity, while those that fail to adapt may suffer relative economic decline.

The United States should therefore place technological innovation at the center of its national economic strategy.

However, innovation should not be understood narrowly as the invention of new technologies. Economic growth depends equally upon the diffusion of innovations throughout the economy. A technological breakthrough produces limited national benefits if it remains confined to a handful of companies or fails to improve productivity across major industries.

American policy should consequently emphasize both scientific discovery and practical adoption.

Universities and research institutions require stable support for fundamental research, whose economic benefits may emerge only after decades. Entrepreneurs need access to capital and competitive markets. Established businesses require incentives to invest in productivity-enhancing technologies. Workers need opportunities to acquire new skills as industries evolve.

Infrastructure also plays an indispensable role. Efficient transportation networks, reliable electricity, modern ports, high-capacity communications systems, and adequate housing near centers of economic activity reduce the costs of production and facilitate economic expansion.

Housing deserves particular attention because restrictions on residential development in economically productive metropolitan areas can prevent workers from moving to places where their labor would generate greater value. Such constraints simultaneously increase living costs, limit labor mobility, and reduce potential economic output.

Human capital is equally essential.

The United States benefits from a combination of domestic educational institutions and its longstanding ability to attract talented individuals from around the world. Immigration has contributed to American entrepreneurship, scientific research, technological development, and economic growth. Preserving this advantage should be understood as a matter of national competitiveness.

A country that attracts ambitious researchers, entrepreneurs, engineers, and skilled workers strengthens its own productive capabilities while expanding the networks through which ideas and capital circulate.

The deeper principle is that national economic strength depends upon institutions that encourage experimentation, reward productive activity, and permit resources to move toward more valuable uses.

A government seeking to strengthen American competitiveness should therefore avoid confusing industrial development with the protection of particular corporations. Policies that preserve inefficient firms, suppress competition, or insulate established industries from innovation may produce politically visible benefits while weakening long-term productivity.

Being pro-business should not mean being pro-corporation. It should mean supporting the competitive conditions under which productive enterprises can emerge, expand, and replace less efficient incumbents.

The purpose of economic policy should be to maximize the productive potential of the American economy, not to preserve any particular distribution of corporate power.

IV. Fiscal Sustainability as a National Security Imperative

Economic strength requires not only productive capacity but also the financial flexibility necessary to respond to changing circumstances.

The United States possesses exceptional fiscal advantages. The dollar remains central to international finance, American government securities occupy an important position in global capital markets, and the country's substantial economic resources provide significant borrowing capacity.

These advantages should not be mistaken for an unlimited ability to accumulate debt without consequences.

Persistent fiscal deficits and rising public debt can gradually constrain national policy by increasing interest expenditures and reducing the resources available for alternative priorities. Higher debt-service costs may place pressure on public investment, defense spending, social programs, and the government's ability to respond to emergencies.

The danger is not necessarily an imminent fiscal collapse. It is the gradual erosion of strategic flexibility.

A government that enters a crisis with a sustainable fiscal position has more options than one already facing severe budgetary pressures. It can borrow when necessary, mobilize resources rapidly, and finance extraordinary expenditures without immediately requiring painful adjustments elsewhere.

This capacity is particularly valuable in an uncertain international environment.

Major wars, financial crises, pandemics, technological disruptions, and other emergencies can impose enormous unexpected costs. Fiscal resilience allows a nation to absorb such shocks while preserving its long-term interests.

Consequently, fiscal sustainability should be regarded as a component of national security rather than merely a domestic budgetary concern.

Yet fiscal discipline must be approached intelligently.

Reducing public expenditures indiscriminately can damage economic growth if it undermines education, scientific research, infrastructure, or other investments that increase future productive capacity. Similarly, tax policies designed solely to maximize short-term revenue may discourage investment and economic activity if poorly constructed.

The appropriate objective is not simply to minimize government spending or public debt. It is to establish a sustainable relationship between public commitments, revenue, and the economy's long-term growth potential.

This requires distinguishing between expenditures that primarily support current consumption and investments that can expand future productive capacity, while recognizing that some social expenditures also contribute to human capital and economic resilience.

A sustainable fiscal framework should protect productive investments, improve the efficiency of government operations, address the long-term drivers of structural deficits, and preserve sufficient flexibility to respond to future emergencies.

The central principle is that the United States should not allow present political incentives to compromise the economic resources available to future generations.

Fiscal sustainability is, in this sense, an obligation to the nation's future strategic independence.

V. Strategic Overextension and the Opportunity Costs of Foreign Policy

The United States' extensive international commitments have provided substantial benefits. American alliances have helped deter aggression, preserve favorable regional balances of power, facilitate economic cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of major conflicts among advanced industrial states.

Nevertheless, international commitments impose costs, and those costs must be evaluated against their contribution to American security and prosperity.

The ability to undertake a military operation does not establish the wisdom of doing so. Nor does the existence of an international problem automatically mean that the United States should assume primary responsibility for resolving it.

Every major foreign policy commitment consumes resources that could otherwise support alternative priorities. Military deployments require personnel, equipment, logistics, and financial expenditures. Prolonged conflicts can generate additional costs through veterans' care, equipment replacement, interest expenses, and the diversion of political attention.

Some commitments produce benefits that substantially exceed these costs. Others do not.

The challenge is to distinguish between them.

American policymakers should adopt a more disciplined framework for evaluating international engagements, distinguishing among vital national interests, important but negotiable interests, and peripheral concerns.

Vital interests include protecting the American homeland, preserving nuclear deterrence, preventing hostile domination of strategically critical regions, and maintaining access to the economic networks essential to national prosperity.

Other interests may justify diplomatic engagement, economic assistance, or limited security cooperation without requiring open-ended military commitments.

This approach would not constitute isolationism. It would represent strategic prioritization.

A country that attempts to exercise decisive influence over every international dispute risks dispersing its resources and weakening its ability to respond effectively where its interests are greatest.

Moreover, American allies possess substantial economic and military capabilities of their own. A sustainable international security architecture should encourage capable partners to assume greater responsibility for their regional defense while preserving the benefits of cooperation and collective deterrence.

Such burden-sharing can strengthen alliances by making them more balanced and durable.

The broader objective should be to prevent foreign policy from becoming a process through which the United States continuously accumulates commitments without adequately considering their long-term economic implications.

Military strength is indispensable, but it should protect the economic foundations of national power rather than progressively consume them.

VI. The Relationship Between Economic Prosperity and Strategic Freedom

One of the most important benefits of economic strength is the freedom of action it provides.

A prosperous nation with a dynamic economy, sustainable public finances, and substantial technological capabilities possesses a wider range of strategic choices than a country constrained by stagnation and financial weakness.

It can modernize its military without sacrificing essential domestic investments. It can assist allies without undermining its own stability. It can withstand economic coercion, absorb disruptions to international trade, and invest in technologies whose strategic value may not become apparent for decades.

Economic strength therefore generates what might be called strategic optionality: the capacity to choose among alternative courses of action without being compelled by immediate financial or material constraints.

This is especially important in a world characterized by uncertainty.

American policymakers cannot know precisely how China's economy will evolve, whether Russia's political system will undergo significant changes, which technologies will transform military capabilities, or what new international crises may emerge.

A grand strategy built upon detailed predictions about these developments will inevitably encounter unexpected circumstances.

By contrast, a strategy centered on strengthening America's economic foundations creates advantages across a wide range of possible futures.

If China continues growing rapidly, a more productive American economy will be better positioned to compete.

If China experiences prolonged stagnation, the United States will still benefit from its own prosperity.

If international tensions intensify, economic strength will support deterrence and resilience.

If diplomatic opportunities emerge, economic strength will provide the confidence and flexibility necessary to pursue negotiated arrangements.

This is a crucial distinction between a strategy organized around the behavior of competitors and one organized around the capabilities of the United States itself.

The former is inherently reactive. The latter establishes a durable foundation for national action.

VII. Strategic Coexistence and the Economic Logic of International Stability

Prioritizing economic strength also suggests a different approach to relations with other major powers.

The United States should recognize that prolonged geopolitical confrontation can impose substantial economic costs even when it does not result in direct military conflict.

Trade restrictions, investment barriers, technological fragmentation, military buildups, and the diversion of resources toward strategic competition can reduce economic efficiency and constrain growth.

Some of these costs are justified by legitimate security concerns. Others may result from unnecessarily expansive definitions of national rivalry.

A successful American strategy should seek to distinguish between competition that protects vital interests and confrontation that generates costs without producing corresponding benefits.

This distinction is especially important in relations with China.

The United States and China possess fundamentally different political systems, historical experiences, and conceptions of political legitimacy. Neither country is likely to persuade the other to abandon its governing philosophy.

Peaceful coexistence does not require agreement about political philosophy. It requires agreement about the rules and limits of international competition.

Both countries have an interest in avoiding catastrophic military conflict, preserving financial stability, maintaining predictable commercial relationships, and preventing disputes from escalating beyond their original causes.

A framework of strategic coexistence would acknowledge enduring rivalry while seeking practical arrangements that reduce unnecessary friction.

Such a framework could include mechanisms for crisis communication, arms-control discussions, reciprocal commercial obligations, transparent trade rules, and negotiated boundaries around strategically sensitive technologies.

Truly fair trade should be an important component of this relationship. The United States should oppose coercive commercial practices, discriminatory market access, intellectual property theft, and other arrangements that undermine legitimate competition. At the same time, it should avoid treating every successful Chinese export industry as evidence of an unacceptable strategic threat.

The objective should be an international economic relationship governed by reciprocity and enforceable rules, not the elimination of economic competition.

A similar logic applies to the relationship between Russia and China.

The United States has a strategic interest in preventing the emergence of a permanently consolidated coalition of major powers opposed to American influence. Yet attempting to exploit differences between Moscow and Beijing requires diplomatic realism, patience, and recognition of the limits of American influence.

The United States cannot simply dictate the relationships other countries maintain. Nor should it compromise essential principles or the security of allies in pursuit of an artificial geopolitical realignment.

Nevertheless, American diplomacy should preserve opportunities to reduce tensions, encourage independent decision-making among other powers, and avoid unnecessarily reinforcing adversarial alignments.

The larger point is that economic strength and diplomatic restraint can reinforce one another.

A confident and prosperous United States may be better positioned to tolerate limited disagreements, negotiate from strength, and avoid interpreting every international development as a test of American credibility.

The purpose of diplomacy should be to preserve a favorable international environment in which American prosperity and security can endure.

VIII. Domestic Prosperity, Social Cohesion, and the Legitimacy of American Power

An economic grand strategy cannot succeed if it measures national strength solely through aggregate output, corporate profits, or financial-market performance.

The productive capacity of the American economy ultimately depends upon the capabilities, opportunities, and confidence of the American people.

A country can experience substantial aggregate economic growth while large portions of its population struggle with housing costs, stagnant purchasing power, limited geographic mobility, or declining confidence in economic institutions.

Such conditions can weaken social cohesion and undermine public support for the international commitments necessary to sustain American influence.

Economic strength should therefore be understood in both aggregate and broadly shared terms.

A successful national strategy should seek rising productivity, sustained growth in real incomes, expanded economic opportunity, and improved access to the essential conditions of a productive life.

This does not require abandoning market competition or attempting to eliminate economic inequality through comprehensive state control. Competitive markets remain powerful mechanisms for coordinating economic activity, encouraging innovation, and allocating resources.

But markets operate within institutional frameworks, and the quality of those frameworks influences whether economic growth produces broad social benefits.

Public investments in education, infrastructure, scientific research, and basic institutional capacity can complement private enterprise. Well-designed social insurance can reduce the consequences of economic disruption and support individuals as they move between jobs, industries, and regions.

The objective should be to establish a society in which economic dynamism and social mobility reinforce one another.

This is also a matter of political legitimacy.

Citizens are more likely to support a country's international responsibilities when they believe the political and economic system provides meaningful opportunities for themselves and their families.

Conversely, a population that perceives economic institutions as serving only a narrow segment of society may become increasingly skeptical of international engagement, trade, immigration, and other policies associated with global economic integration.

A grand strategy that neglects domestic prosperity may eventually undermine its own political foundations.

The United States should therefore recognize that the strength of its international position is connected to the economic confidence of its citizens.

National power should ultimately serve the security, prosperity, and freedom of the population from which it derives.

IX. Toward an Economic Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century

An American grand strategy organized around economic strength would require a reordering of priorities rather than a wholesale abandonment of existing institutions.

Its first priority would be the continuous expansion of America's productive capabilities.

This would involve promoting technological innovation, improving education and workforce development, expanding economically valuable infrastructure, reducing unnecessary barriers to investment and competition, and maintaining the country's attractiveness to international talent and capital.

Its second priority would be preserving long-term fiscal sustainability.

The federal government should establish a credible framework for managing structural deficits and debt while protecting investments that contribute to future economic growth. The objective would be to ensure that public finances remain capable of supporting national priorities across generations.

Its third priority would be maintaining a military establishment sufficient to protect vital American interests and deter aggression.

Military superiority should be pursued where necessary, but defense policy should place greater emphasis on effectiveness, technological adaptability, allied contributions, and the relationship between strategic objectives and economic costs.

Its fourth priority would be preserving an international economic environment favorable to American prosperity.

The United States should defend fair commercial rules, maintain strong relationships with allies and trading partners, protect critical supply chains, and resist coercive practices. But it should also recognize that excessive economic fragmentation can undermine the benefits of international specialization and exchange.

Its fifth priority would be the disciplined management of geopolitical competition.

The United States should maintain credible deterrence while pursuing strategic coexistence with China, preserving diplomatic channels with adversaries, and avoiding unnecessary commitments that consume resources without materially improving national security.

These priorities should not be treated as isolated policy objectives. They form an integrated conception of national power.

Economic growth supports technological innovation and fiscal capacity. Technological innovation strengthens both civilian productivity and military capabilities. Fiscal sustainability preserves the ability to respond to crises. Military deterrence protects the conditions under which commerce and investment can flourish. Diplomacy reduces the risks and costs associated with international competition.

The success of the strategy depends upon maintaining these mutually reinforcing relationships.

There is, however, an important limitation. Economic strength is a necessary foundation of durable national power, but it is not sufficient by itself. Wealth does not automatically produce sound strategy, effective institutions, social cohesion, or wise political leadership. Nor does economic interdependence guarantee peace. A prosperous country can still make catastrophic geopolitical decisions.

For that reason, economic primacy must be accompanied by institutional competence, credible deterrence, political accountability, and prudent diplomacy.

The argument is not that economic policy should replace national security policy. It is that economic strength should establish the material foundation and long-term constraints within which national security policy operates.

X. Measuring Success by American Renewal Rather Than Adversarial Decline

Perhaps the most important change required by this strategy is conceptual.

American policymakers frequently evaluate international competition through relative measures: whether China is gaining influence, whether Russia is expanding its military capabilities, or whether another country is increasing its share of global production.

These measures are relevant, but they should not become the exclusive standards by which American success is judged.

The United States can become more prosperous even while other countries grow. It can strengthen its security without requiring the economic collapse of its competitors. It can maintain substantial international influence without attempting to exercise decisive control over every region or political dispute.

Relative power matters, especially where military capabilities and coercive influence are concerned. But national prosperity is not a fixed quantity that must be taken from another country.

A strategy focused primarily on weakening competitors risks subordinating American economic interests to the fortunes of other states.

It also creates the possibility of mistaking another country's difficulties for American success.

Chinese stagnation would not automatically improve American productivity. Russian economic weakness would not resolve American fiscal imbalances. A decline in another country's technological capabilities would not necessarily strengthen American research institutions.

The United States should therefore measure strategic success primarily through improvements in its own capabilities.

Is the American economy becoming more productive? Are real incomes rising? Are American institutions generating new technologies and industries? Is the country attracting talented people and productive investment? Are public finances becoming more sustainable? Does the United States possess greater freedom to respond to international challenges?

These questions provide a more constructive and durable framework for national strategy.

The most successful outcome of American competition with China would not necessarily be China's decline. It would be an international environment in which the United States remains prosperous, secure, technologically advanced, and capable of defending its interests while avoiding catastrophic conflict.

Such an outcome would constitute a meaningful strategic achievement regardless of whether China continued to prosper.

Conclusion: National Strength Begins at Home

The United States enters the twenty-first century with extraordinary advantages. It possesses a large and sophisticated economy, leading scientific and educational institutions, deep financial markets, substantial natural resources, a powerful military, and an extensive network of international alliances.

Yet none of these advantages should be regarded as permanent.

Economic dynamism can weaken. Fiscal flexibility can erode. Technological leadership can diminish. Institutions can become less effective, and international commitments can expand beyond the resources available to sustain them.

The preservation of American power therefore requires a deliberate recognition of the relationship between national prosperity and international influence.

The United States should not organize its grand strategy around the assumption that its military predominance can compensate indefinitely for domestic economic weaknesses. Nor should it pursue geopolitical competition in ways that unnecessarily undermine the productive foundations of its own strength.

Instead, American policymakers should embrace a more durable principle: the first responsibility of a great power is to maintain the economic capacity upon which its security, independence, and influence depend.

This principle offers a coherent approach to the challenges posed by China, Russia, technological change, fiscal pressures, and international instability.

It suggests that the United States should pursue strategic coexistence where possible, maintain deterrence where necessary, exercise discipline in its international commitments, and devote sustained attention to the domestic institutions responsible for economic growth.

It also establishes a more constructive definition of national success.

The ultimate objective of American grand strategy should not be military supremacy for its own sake, the permanent subordination of competing powers, or the indefinite preservation of every existing international arrangement.

It should be the continued security, prosperity, freedom, and independence of the American people.

Military power protects these objectives. Diplomacy advances them. Alliances reinforce them. But economic strength makes their sustained pursuit possible.

The United States should seek to prevail in the twenty-first century not primarily by weakening its competitors, but by continuously strengthening itself.

A nation that remains economically dynamic, technologically innovative, fiscally resilient, and politically capable of renewal will possess the resources necessary to defend its interests and adapt to an uncertain world.

That is the foundation of enduring American power—and it should be the organizing principle of American grand strategy for the century ahead.